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A PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL OF
MERGER CONTROL UNDER THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
LUCILE SHEPPARD KEYES*

INCE THE passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
(Act),' five proposals for airline mergers or acquisitions of control have been considered by the Civil Aeronautics Board (the
Board). Of these, three have been formally approved and two have
been terminated by action of the applicants after tentative Board
disapproval. A sixth such proposal has received the blessing of an
administrative law judge and awaits decision by the Board.' Although the evidence presently available is not as extensive as could
be desired-in particular, it would have been enlightening to have a
full, formal exposition of the Board's reasoning in at least one decision disapproving a merger or acquisition-the record is adequate
* Dr. Keyes is an economist engaged in independent research and consulting
in Washington, D.C. She is the author of FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO
AIR TRANSPORTATION (Harvard University
AIR CARGO TRANSPORTATION (American

Press, 1951), REGULATORY
Enterprise Institute, 1980)
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and many

articles on regulation and related topics in economic and legal journals. She is
a member of the Advisory Board of the JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE.
1 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 13011504 (1976)). Section 1378 amends section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1504 (amended 1978). This section governs economic
regulation of air carrier mergers and other airline control relationships.
' Since this article was completed, the Board has announced its approval of
one additional merger proposal (Tiger International-Seaboard World Airlines,
Inc., Acquisition Case, CAB Docket No. 33,712, approval of which was announced by CAB Press Release 80-91, May 8, 1980) and its tentative approval
of another (Application of Republic Airlines, Inc. for Approval of the Acquisition of Hughes Air Corporation d/b/a Hughes Airwest, CAB Docket No.
38,086, tentative approval of which was announced by CAB Press Release 80-95,
May 16, 1980). In neither case does the Board propose to issue a formal
opinion detailing the rationale of its action. In Tiger-Seaboard, the Board will
merely affirm the decision of the administrative law judge without endorsing his
reasoning; in Republic-Airwest, the Board tentatively decided to approve the
merger without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.

72

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[46

to provide a basis for a preliminary appraisal of the economic implications of the deregulation Act's new merger provision. This paper
will deal specifically with the economic aspects of merger regulation. With a few brief exceptions, it will not address other aspects,
such as broader "public interest" considerations, the imposition of
protective labor conditions, or the granting of immunity from prosecution under the general antitrust laws. Before discussing the individual cases, it will be useful to set forth briefly the background
and content of the new criteria by which mergers and acquisitions
are judged and to point out how they differ from the criteria of
the original provision in the Federal Aviation Act.
MERGER CRITERIA, OLD AND NEW
Under the old law, a proposed airline merger, consolidation or
acquisition of control was to be approved by the Board unless it
found that the transaction would "not be consistent with the public
interest," subject to the proviso that no transaction was to be approved "which would result in a monopoly or monopilies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not a
party" to the transaction.! Apart from this narrow "monopoly"
proviso in section 408 of the Act, the discretion granted to the
agency was constrained only by the requirement that in determining what is consistent with the public interest it consider, "among
other things," the list of factors contained in section 102 of the
Act." "Competition" was mentioned in this list but was not accorded
any determinate weight among a host of other considerations including the maintenance of "sound economic conditions."5 Boardapproved transactions received automatic immunity from prosecution under the antitrust laws.
The actual administration of merger control under the old r6gime
349 U.S.C. § 1378 (Federal Aviation Act of 1958, amended 1978). This act
also contained a second proviso which limited the Board's power to approve

acquisitions involving air carriers and surface carriers. Id. This provision is omitted
in the amended version. 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (Supp. 11 1978).
449 U.S.C. § 1378 (Supp. 11 1978).
349 U.S.C. 5 1378 (amended 1978). Section 102 of the Federal Aviation
Act was amended by the Airline Deregulation Act to reflect the new intent of

Congress that the industry should become more competitive. 49 U.S.C. 5 1301
(Supp.II 1978).
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was summarized recently by a CAB administrative law judge as
follows:
Parties to merger proceedings customarily introduced into the
record wide-ranging evidence as to the "good" and "bad" effects
of a proposed merger. On the "good" side of the ledger would be
placed evidence of such matters as cost saving, service improvements, subsidy reduction, financial strengthening of smaller carriers
vis-a-vis large carriers, and other procompetitive aspects. On the
"bad" side would be placed evidence of anti-competitive effects,
diversion of traffic from other carriers, lack of route "fit", disruption of the Board's route policies for particular areas, and the like.
Faced with this array of evidence, the Board customarily engaged
in a weighing of the pros and cons of the proposed transaction....
The Board considered it necessary to judge the reasonableness of
the consideration paid for the acquired properties and the fairness
of the stock-exchange ratios involved. Customarily, the Board's
merger review included inquiry into the transaction's probable impact upon employees of the carriers.
While acknowledging from time to time that national antitrust
policy was an important public interest consideration, the Board
also took the position that it was "not an antitrust court" and that
"concepts and specific criteria developed by the courts in interpreting the provisions of the Clayton Act in the context of free market
conditions are not necessarily determinative of whether a proposed
action meets ... the overall public interest considerations deemed
relevant by the framers of the Federal Aviation Act. . . ." Under
this interpretation of the prior law, the Board's antitrust resolve
was erratic; and with the broad discretion afforded by the "public
interest" test, antitrust policy was often ignored (citations omitted). ....
The new law, by contrast, provides much more explicitly for
the employment of traditional antitrust criteria. The "public interest" test is retained, but also provided is that the Board may not
grant approval if it finds that either of two additional tests, the
"antitrust tests," will not be passed. The first of these, the "Sherman
Act test," requires that approval be denied to any transaction which
8

North Central-Southern Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 33,136 at 21-23
(February 9, 1979) (decision of the administrative law judge). Judge Saunders'
excellent introductory discussion also contains a systematic comparison of the
texts of the old and new merger provisions which should be very useful to
readers desiring more complete details in this regard. Id. at 33. For a history
of merger regulation under the old law, see Keyes, Notes on the History
of Federal Regulation of Airline Mergers, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 357 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as Keyes].
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"would result in a monopoly or would be in furtherance of any
combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of air transportation in any region of the United
States."' The second, the "Clayton Act test," requires disapproval
of any transaction
the effect of which in any region of the United States may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,
or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless
the Board finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
transaction are outweighed in the public interest by the probable
effect of the transaction in meeting significant transportation conveniences and needs of the public, and unless it finds that such
significant transportation conveniences and needs may not be
satisfied by a reasonably available alternative having materially
less anticompetitive effects.'
The new law further provides that the burden of proving the anticompetitive effects shall be borne by "the party challenging the
transaction," and that the "proponents of the transaction shall bear
the burden of proving that it meets the significant transportation
conveniences and needs of the public and that such conveniences
and needs may not be satisfied by a less anticompetitive alternative.'

Antitrust immunity is not automatically conferred on transactions approved by the Board. The Board may grant such immunity, but only after finding that it is required in the public interest,
and only "to the extent necessary to enable [the proponents] to
proceed with the transaction specifically approved by the Board
...and those transactions necessarily contemplated"1 by its order
of approval. The new decisional rule is slated to survive the gradual
narrowing of the Board's regulatory jurisdiction and the eventual
demise of the agency as provided in the Deregulation Act. The
Board's authority over mergers and similar intercarrier transactions
is to be transferred to the Department of Justice on January 1,
1983, in the field of domestic and overseas air transportation and
on January 1, 1985, in the international field." However, there is
749 U.S.C. § 1378(b)(1) (A) (Supp. I 1978).
'id. § 1378(b)(1)(B).
'Id. S 1378(b)(1).
1049 U.S.C. § 1384 (Supp. IT 1978).
"The Airline Deregulation Act, containing a new Title XVI (Sunset Pro-
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no provision for any change in the content of the authority; therefore, the criterion of judgment will remain unaltered.
The range of discretion enjoyed by the Board under the new law
appears to be much narrower than before. With the introduction
of the second or "Clayton Act test," Congress apparently intended
to increase the scope of the new antitrust provisions, thereby compelling the Board to conform more closely to accepted general
antitrust principles and to give more attention to possible anticompetitive effects than it has in the past. Indeed, there is a good
deal of evidence in the legislative history that the statute was so
intended. For example, the Conference Report accompanying the
bill which became the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 contains
the following statement:
The foundation of the new airline legislation is that it is in the
public interest to allow the airline industry to be governed by the
forces of the marketplace. Consistent with that promise, mergers
of air carriers should be governed by the same standards that are
applied to mergers of other firms. 2
The report accompanying the predecessor Senate bill declared
that the "fundamental objection" to the existing section 408 was
that it permitted the Board "to approve mergers without undertaking the comprehensive competitive analysis required by the antitrust laws of similar transactions." Thus, the report continues,
the Board has tended to regard the merger as a tool for insuring
the financial well-being of an economically ailing air carrier. As
a result, analyses of Board merger cases show that the CAB has
not analyzed the possibility that merging carriers would be potential as well as actual competitors and has not required carriers to
demonstrate that they attempted to find less anticompetitive
partners."
visions) of the Federal Aviation Act, provides for transfer of merger control to
the Department of Justice, 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. II 1978).
'1H.R.
REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1978). In the Congressional
debates immediately preceding the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act, comment on the new provision similarly emphasized that it was intended to insure
adherence to antitrust principles. The members who spoke on this subject were
at this time especially concerned that the Board's policies be no more procompetitive than those prescribed by the general antitrust laws; however, it
appears that this unusual emphasis was a result of the Board's reported reaction to one or more current merger proposals. See Vol. 134 CONG. REC. H.
13446-47, S. 18796-800 (daily ed., Oct. 14, 1978).
'3S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1978). The discussion closely
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On the other hand, the inclusion of the qualifying clause allowing approval of transactions with overriding public gains seems to
require at a minimum that more attention be given to mergerrelated benefits than would be appropriate under the general antitrust laws. The recorded history of the legislation does not appear
to justify going beyond this minimal interpretation. The entire

new merger criteria, including the qualifying clause, were supported early in 1975 by representatives of the Ford Administration

in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure' and later that year were incorporated in
the Administration-sponsored bill providing for other far-reaching
changes in the Federal Aviation Act." Subsequent proposals that
the general antitrust laws be applied in the airline field, such as
the Cannon-Kennedy "Air Transportation Regulatory Reform Act
of 1977, '.1 were opposed by the Board, the Department of Transportation, and other parties,' but supported by the Department of
Justice to which jurisdiction would have been transferred. 8 The
official opponents concentrated on peripheral issues such as the
parallels a statement made by the then Assistant Attorney General in charge
of Antitrust before the Senate Commerce Committee in 1976, in support of
the Ford Administration's general airline regulatory reform legislation. Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation
of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 333 (1976). This statement was in turn an expansion of a view expressed by the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General in charge of Antitrust before the "Kennedy Subcommittee"
in March, 1975. Oversight of CAB Prac. & Proc.: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Prac. and Proc. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1746-47 (1975). [hereinafter cited as CAB Oversight Hearings].
"4See CAB Oversight Hearings, supra note 13.
15S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
1I S. 689, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
"The Secretary of Transportation opposed transfer of jurisdiction to the
Justice Department, but supported a "stronger merger standard" to be administered by the Board. Regulatory Reform in Air Transp.: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. of Commerce, Science, and Transp.,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1346 (1977). The Chairman of the CAB warned that
"legitimate air transportation considerations might be subordinated to more
orthodox antitrust factors in circumstances in which the reviewing agency may
have little incentive to expedite its air transport case load in view of its broader
responsibilities," and noted that the power to impose labor protective conditions
would "presumably be abolished." Id. at 171. Some airline management and
labor union representatives expressed opposition. Id. at 1485, 928-29, 1281,
1287; the president of United Air Lines suggested continuation of Board jurisdiction under a merger standard similar to, but not identical with, the Bank
Merger Act criterion. Id. at 439.
"I1d.at 1388, 1390.
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need to protect airline employees affected by mergers and procedural delays which might result if jurisdiction were transferred;
they failed to concentrate on developing substantive arguments in
support of special treatment of mergers in the airline field. The
subsequent Congressional reports and debates appear to be equally
devoid of substantive reasoning."9
In economic terms, the new criteria seem to promise an opportunity for the administering agency to judge each individual proposal on the basis of its probable detriments and benefits. Instead
of being principally guided by an essentially undefined notion of
"public interest" which could justify approval of mergers regardless of competitive and other considerations relating to economic
efficiency, the agency is directed to devote major attention to weighing against each other two specific kinds of effects: the public
detriment caused by lessening of competition and the public benefit embodied in "transportation conveniences and needs." The overall goal of maximizing net benefits is served by the statutory requirement that, to be admitted to the positive side of the scale,
benefits must not be attainable by a "reasonably available alternative having materially less anticompetitive effects."' A second prescribed condition provides that a questionable balance shall be
treated as a defeat for the proposal, since approval requires a definite finding that the detriments are outweighed. 1 This requirement
is not so readily justified but seems to offer no great threat to a
19For example, the House report on S. 2493, H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1978), contains a rather extensive discussion of the content of the Bank Merger Act criterion and the major aspects of its interpretation by the courts but does not explain why the airline industry is singled out

for special treatment. The argument for the original proposal of the qualifying
clause (which may have little or no relevance to the final legislation) was summarized by a Ford Administration spokesman as follows: "In short, strict antitrust policy may sometimes conflict with sound transportation policy. . . .Under
strict antitrust analysis if a proposed merger affected ten markets with beneficial impact in nine and anticompetitive results in one, the merger would be
denied despite the significant transportation benefits." CAB Oversight Hearings,
supra note 13, at 2154. Given the apparently intended nine-to-one ratio of

benefits to detriments, it is difficult to say how "strict antitrust policy" as here
interpreted would be suitable for any industry; on the other hand, if it is suitable for industry in general, it is difficult to see why it is not suitable for air
transportation. Special treatment remains unexplained.
- 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b)(1)(B) (Supp II 1978).
21Id.
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generally reliable weighing process. The actual significance of this
condition will be touched on in the concluding section.
Cases passed upon by the Board to date have been judged primarily by application of the second antitrust test or "Clayton Act
test"; the "Sherman Act test" has not been at issue. The following
discussion of these cases will be concerned with determining the
extent to which the use of the new criteria seem to be fulfilling its
substantive promise of judgment on the economic merits of each
individual transaction. However, this discussion will also suggest
some tentative conclusions regarding fulfillment of the apparent
legislative intent to limit the range of administrative discretion
and to bring more attention to bear on the possible public benefits
of the proposed transactions than would be thought appropriate
under the general antitrust laws.
THE CASES

By far the most extensive exposition of the Board's views on
merger policy under the new Act is contained in its consolidated
October 1979 decision, Texas International-NationalAquisition
Case, Pan American-Acquisition of Control and Merger with National.' This case approved the acquisition of National Airlines
by Texas International Airlines [such portion of the case to be
referred to as Texas International-National]and the acquisition of
and merger with National Airlines by Pan American World Airways [such portion of the case to be referred to as Pan AmericanNational]. This approval was contrary to the prior recommendations of an administrative law judge."3 In each case, the Board's
decision was based on a finding that the transaction as approved
would result in no substantial lessening of competition. As will be
noted, approval in Pan American-Nationalwas subject to a condition excepting transfer of one of the affected routes.
Texas International-National
From an economist's point of view, the outstanding feature of
2 Texas International-National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition of Control of and Merger with National, CAB Docket Nos. 33,112, 33,283,
CAB Order Nos. 79-12-163, 79-12-164, 79-12-165 (October 24, 1979).
23Texas International-National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition of Control and Merger with National, CAB Docket Nos. 33,112, 33,283
(April 5, 1979) (decision of administrative law judge).
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this decision is its relatively realistic appraisal of the significance
of market shares and concentration ratios in judging the probable
effects of the proposed transactions on competition, both actual
and potential. The "market share" of any firm is defined as the
percentage of total sales in any given market which is accounted
for by the sales of that firm. "Concentration ratios" generally refer
to the percentage of total sales in any given market accounted
for by a certain number of the largest sellers. Thus, a "four-firm
concentration ratio of eighty percent" occurs in any market when
the four firms with the largest amount of sales in that market
account for eighty percent of the total sales in that market.
The more orthodox approach to the problem is exemplified in
the arguments relied upon by the administrative law judge. In the
Houston-New Orleans market served by both Texas International
and National, the judge added the existing market shares of the
two carriers, calculated the shares of the market accounted for by
the largest and two largest carriers, respectively, after the shares of
the two carriers were combined, and compared the results with
market shares which previously had been held "presumptively" unlawful by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
PhiladelphiaNational Bank."' To the proponents' contention that
persistence of other competitors in the market would offset anticompetitive effects, the judge replied that the merged carrier's share
of the market was likely to increase despite these competitors'
efforts.' The proponents also argued that anticompetitive consequences would be prevented by new entry, now made easy by the
loosening of regulatory control. The judge countered by noting the
possibility of short-run use of monopoly power and by referring
to administrative and judicial decisions denying that potential competition can adequately compensate for the elimination of actual
competition.' With respect to the many city-pair markets in which
Texas International and National appeared to be potential com- 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Texas International-National Acquisition Case, Pan
American Acquisition of Control and Merger with National, CAB Docket Nos.
33,112, 33,283 (April 5, 1979) (decision of administrative law judge).
25 Texas International-National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition of

Control and Merger with National, CAB Docket Nos. 33,112 33,283 at 67-68
(April 5, 1979) (decision of administrative law judge).
"Id. at 69-70. Direct evidence intended to show the likelihood of actual new
entry was held to be unpersuasive.
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petitors, the judge, following judicial precedent, relied on concentration ratios as indicators of whether or not the markets in question
were already adequately competitive, and also relied on judicial
precedent in defining the specific percentage shares sufficient to
show that a given market is "concentrated.""'
The Board, on the other hand, emphasized the inadequacy of
market share as an indicator of the effectiveness of competition in
airline markets, largely on the ground that, in the absence of special
conditions inhibiting new competition, potential competition could
be expected to assure satisfactory economic performance. In a
general introductory statement relating to its decision not to "rely
heavily on market share data," the Board explained:
Airline markets are nearly always concentrated by traditional
antitrust standards, yet most are competitive in performance. The
use of market share data has not been found particularly helpful
in establishing the probable competitive performance of individual city-pair markets, and one must look at other factors to
assess the competitive impact of changes in market structure.
Those factors include direct constraints on airport entry (such
as slot or gate shortages or impediments imposed in response to
environmental problems), the potential that an apparently dominant position at a given airport or city might create an entry
barrier, or that dominance (or "shared dominance") at numerous
hubs within a region could inhibit entry into markets within that
area, or that a pattern of similar market shares over a network
of routes could create a potential for tacit collusion."
Analyzing the impact of the Texas International-Nationalacquisition in the Houston-New Orleans market, the Board found that,
despite the resulting concentration ratios, the transaction "would
not lead to a probable anticompetitive effect" because of the "significant number of competing carriers," the fact that new entry
had "recently been accomplished by a relatively small firm," the
possibility that "price competition may be contributing to a substantial shake-up in market shares," and the existence of "other
carriers with a ready ability to enter." 9
Id. at 72.
2'Texas International-National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition
of Control of, and Merger with National, CAB Docket Nos. 33,112, 33,283,
CAB Order Nos. 79-12-163, 79-12-164, 79-12-165, at 12 (October 24, 1979).
21 Id. at 6. See also id. at 18-19.
27
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With regard to markets in which the prospective merger participants were potential competitors, the Board again pointed out that
concentration ratios were misleading. In general, it asserted, such
ratios are significant only as "proxies" for "probable noncompetitive performance. '"' In the airline industry where "it is relatively
easy for a new firm to enter any given city-pair," the ratios are not
reliable proxies. 1 Thus, "[b]arriers to entry must be analyzed before
any reliable hypothesis on competitive performance can be made."'
On the basis of its recent experience with multiple permissive entry
awards under the Deregulation Act, which resulted in new entry
into over 130 domestic markets (some by more than one carrier)
and on the basis of its extensive past experience in evaluating
"start-up" costs, the Board concluded that non-regulatory entry
barriers are as a rule insignificant in individual airline markets."
The Board conceded that special conditions, such as "a lack of
other credible entrants or . . . specific airport or other external
deficiencies in National's markets that an independent [Texas International] might be uniquely qualified to overcome,"" could result
in difficulties should the carriers merge. Hence an examination of
each of the affected markets was undertaken and the Board discovered "no convincing demonstration that entry [was] particularly constrained or that there [was] an insufficient number of
other potential entrants so as to establish any special need for
a continued presence" of either of the carriers.' Factors considered here included the presence of Texas International facilities
at one or both ends of a route, the number of other carriers
actually serving the market or possessing facilities at either end,
the size of these other carriers' systems in the Southern Tier region
and their enplanements at the principal terminal (Houston), and
the possibility that Texas International might have a special ability
to overcome the environmental restraints at the San Diego airport.'
The Board's realistic appreciation of the weakness of market
30Jd. at 6.
31 Id.

3d.
'3Id.at
1 Id. at
5Id. at
'4Id. at

28-29.
29-30.

7.
31.
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share as an index of probable anticompetitive effect and its recognition of the importance of other factors, such as entry conditions
and relative competitive capabilities of the firms concerned, as
determinants of this effect represent highly welcome departures
from the orthodoxy of the past. Nevertheless, it must be said that
the enumeration of these factors and the qualitative evaluation of
their role in the particular markets involved appears to fall short
of making a compelling case that the proposed acquisition would
have little or no substantial anticompetitive consequences. Even
in the Houston-New Orleans market, where there were several
trunkline incumbents and a vigorous new entrant on a "turnaround" basis," it is surely reasonable to believe that an independent National would have continued to be a strong competitor for
a considerable period of time. The existence of any strong competitor is, generally speaking, a positive factor in assuring that tacit
collusion does not develop among the incumbents. Moreover, the
influence of potential competition cannot be evaluated without some
reliable estimate of the timing of its initiation and the development
of its full impact. In the "potential competition markets," there
was persuasive direct evidence that in the absence of the merger
new competition would in fact have been initiated by one of the
participants and vigorously pursued. 8 Whatever the situation of
the other potential entrants and their special capabilities, it is difficult to maintain that the participant's entry probably would have
been of negligible value to consumers. In general, to realize the
fallibility of market shares and concentration ratios is merely a
first step toward the evaluation of anticompetitive consequences,
and a genuine evaluation would require an attempt to predict the
magnitude and timing of such effects.
The Board, however, concluded that the second antitrust test
had been successfully passed; therefore, there was no occasion to
consider the matter of "transportation conveniences and needs.'
37Id. at 18-19.
38See Texas International-National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition of Control of, and Merger with National, CAB Docket Nos. 33,112, 33,283
at 61-64 (April 5, 1979) (decision of the administrative law judge).
11The administrative law judge has found that Texas International's argument purporting to show that the merger would result in "improved service
and cost savings" was "nothing more than a claim," with "no evidentiary support
at all." Id. at 82. Estimates of cost saving had not even been attempted, and
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The first antitrust test was not at issue in the proceeding, and various suggested "public interest" factors, including the possibility of
a long period of "cross-ownership" without actual merger of the
parties, the question of continued United States citizenship on the
part of Texas International (in view of foreign ownership of some
of its securities), the possible encouragement of a "merger wave"
among other United States airlines, the general preferability of
internal expansion to growth by combination, and certain alleged
violations of section 408 by Texas International, were held not to
warrant disapproval."0
Pan American-National
In deciding upon the Pan American-National proposal, the
Board also rejected an orthodox market share analysis which had
been relied on by the administrative law judge. The domestic markets at issue in this proceeding were those actually served by National in which Pan American was regarded as a potential competitor. The Board's reasoning with respect to these markets was
essentially the same as that adopted in connection with the Texas
International-Nationalproposal and the factual context was also
essentially similar. There was persuasive evidence that if the merger
was disapproved Pan American would have mounted a strong independent initiative in these markets. 1 In spite of this evidence,
the Board found no probability of substantial lessening of competition in any of these markets because a number of other carriers
were already operating in them or were favorably situated to enter,
because extensive new route awards were affecting these markets,
and because experience, equipment, and route systems were already
possessed by potential new entrants as well as incumbent competitors.'
there was "no evidence concerning how [Texas International] would operate a
combined [Texas International]-National system." Id. at 82-83.
40Texas

International-National

Acquisition Case,

Pan American

Acquisi-

tion of Control of and Merger with National, CAB Order Nos. 79-12-163,
79-12-164, 79-12-165 at 61-64 (Oct. 24, 1979).
41 Id. at 55-56. It is stated that "Pan American entered
several of these
markets in conjunction with international service after the close of the hearing."
Id. at 55, n. 138. See also Texas International- National Acquisition Case, Pan

American- Acquisition of Control of and Merger with National, CAB Docket
Nos. 33,112, 33,283 at 112-13 (Apr. 5, 1979)
law judge).

(decision of the administrative

42Texas International-National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisi-
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Pan American and National were in actual competition in the
United States-Western Europe market and in several specific submarkets included therein. For all affected markets except United
States-London, the Board concluded that the elimination of National would not substantially lessen competition. This conclusion
was made on the basis of arguments paralleling those employed
regarding Houston-New Orleans in the Texas InternationalNational context and on the basis of the openness of these markets
to new competition. With respect to the United States-Western
Europe market, the decision generally characterized the situation
as follows:
Competitive conditions in the United States-Western Europe
market have changed markedly in recent months, and we believe
that as a result the reduction by one of the number of United
States scheduled carriers will have little impact on competiton.
Over the past few years the United States government has promoted and encouraged liberalized entry in international aviation.
The results of this effort are now being seen in the form of bilateral
agreements with some European nations which permit United
States carriers, unrestricted in number, to fly to virtually any major
point (city) in those nations.'
Focusing attention on "areas in Western Europe . . . served by
National and where the effects on competition would be felt as a
result of the merger," the Board observed that most of these points
were in countries which were covered by agreements providing for
multiple designations," which several United States airlines had
already been authorized to serve, and concluded that "the level
of competition in those markets (specifically, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Zurich, and Paris) [would] not be diminished as a result of
the merger."'' Foreign carriers-those of West German, Belgian,
and Dutch nationality-had also been granted broad authority to
serve United States-European routes, and could be expected to
provide additional competition. Lower fares and increasing traffic
tion of Control of the Merger with National, CAB Order Nos. 79-12-163,
79-12-164, 79-12-165 at 56-57 (Oct. 24, 1979).
Id. at 37.
"Id. at 39. The term "multiple designation" or "multiple entry" is used to
characterize the entry provisions in bilateral airline agreements which place no
restrictions on the number of U.S. carriers which may serve points in the other
party's territory. Id. at n. 78.
"Id.

at 39-40.
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in the transatlantic market were cited as evidence of "more competitive" behavior in the recent past." Conceding that the merger
would "result in the loss of one United States carrier" in the four
continental European cities served by National, the Board found
that "liberalized entry and recent route awards for foreign and
United States carriers [were] sufficient to compensate for the loss
of competition occasioned by the merger."'
Approval of the merger was granted subject to the condition that
National's Miami-London authority not be transferred to Pan
American; the selection of a carrier to operate this route was to
be the subject of a new proceeding."' Without this condition, the
Board found, the proposed merger would have resulted in a substantial reduction in competition in the United States-London submarket of the United States-Western Europe market. Since it had
already recognized the latter market as a significant unit throughout which competition existed to a significant extent, the Board
was obliged to explain its simultaneous acceptance of United
States-London as a significant submarket,' with an implied degree
of immunity from competition with services from the United States
to other European gateways. The explanation cited the indisputable
fact that a large proportion of United States-Western Europe
travellers do choose the London gateway, and the equally undoubted superiority of London over other British destination cities
in airport facilities and "the attractions of a well known cosmopolitan center...."'
These facts alone would not, of course, have been sufficient to
show that a significantly large United States-London submarket
really did exist. An obvious minimum requirement of useful market
(or submarket) definition is that competition within the market
16 Id. at 40-41.
47
Id. at 42.
41 Miami-London Case, CAB Docket No. 36,764. Pending carrier selection,
Pan American was authorized by exemption to serve the Miami-London route.
48 Since the Board's analysis does not attribute an equivalent anticompetitive
impact to a given percentage share in a submarket as in the market which
contained it, the idea of a significant submarket is in this context not necessarily
illogical.

See generally Keyes, Proposals for the Control of Conglomerate

Mergers, 34 S. EcoN. J. 67, 80-82 (1967).
5Texas International-National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition
of Control of and Merger with National, CAB Order Nos. 79-12-163, 79-12-164,
79-12-165 at 46 (Oct. 24, 1979).
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(or submarket) can be shown to be more effective in promoting
or protecting the interests of consumers than competition from the
outside, otherwise there would be no justification for attributing
special "antitrust" significance to intramarket (or intrasubmarket)
concentration. Therefore, to demonstrate the existence of a significantly large United States-London submarket, it would have
been necessary to show that a large number of United Statesoriginated passengers not only preferred London to other gateways,
but were in fact so devoted to this preference that they were subject to an unacceptable degree of exploitation because of a deficiency in the amount of competition between the United States as a
whole and the London gateway, regardless of the fact that United
States passengers destined for Western Europe, of which the United
States-London travellers made up almost half, had been found to
be adequately protected from exploitation because of the overall
level of competition between this country and various Western
European destinations.
Given this finding, it was evident that not all of the United
States-London travellers were crucially dependent upon or addicted
to services specifically directed to the London gateway; in fact, it
would appear highly likely that some considerable proportion of
the United States-London traffic would be more attractive and
more protected from exploitation by a given bargain fare from a
nearby United States point to, for example, Amsterdam, than by a
bargain service from a distant United States gateway to London.
At the very least, availability of the Amsterdam alternative would
strictly limit the opportunity of the airlines serving London to
maintain high prices or poor service. It does not appear that this
problem of market definition was adequately dealt with by the
Board. All or most of the United States-London passengers were
apparently counted as being within the affected submarket;1 beyond this, it was merely noted that services to London from alterId. at 45-46. "[T]he large numbers of U.S. passengers who choose London
I"
as a first (or only) destination distinguishes London from other European
points . . . .[A] United States-London submarket is justified . . .on the basis
of its size and commercial importance .... ." Id. A footnote appended here
notes that "[iun 1978, about 1.4 million U.S. passengers deplaned at London,"
and that this number "represents two-thirds of all U.S. passengers who deplaned at London, Brussels, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Paris in 1978." Id. at 46,
n. 118.
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native United States gateways actually did compete for some unspecified portion of the traffic.
Having thus "defined" a unified submarket insulated from the
competition of services to alternative European gateways, the Board
pointed out that the number of direct United States-London competitors was strictly limited under the Bermuda IP2 bilateral agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, so that
new entrants could not be expected to compensate for the loss of
existing competition. In finding that the elimination of one relatively minor carrier among the many" serving the submarket would
substantially lessen competition, the Board did not commit itself
to a market share analysis, to a general endorsement of the maintenance of any minimum number of carriers per market, or to a
general presumption against the elimination of any one competitor. It relied instead upon circumstances peculiar to the United
States-London service; namely, the particular effectiveness of carrier diversity on this route as illustrated by reference to very recent
history, and the need to preserve an opportunity for the entry of a
"new low-fare competitor."" In sum, by means of ingenious market
definition and reliance on a unique historical background, the
Board was able to single out for special treatment a potentially
troublesome aspect of the proposed merger' and at the same time
was able to avoid the adoption of any general principle which might
have proved awkward in a different factual context.
To complete the argument for denying approval of the transfer
of the Miami-London route to Pan American, the Board found
"Air Services Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, July 23, 1977. T.I.A.S. 8641, 28
U.S.T. 5367.
5 Scheduled airlines serving the United States-London market included Pan
American, Trans World Airlines, Braniff, Delta, National, Laker, and British
Airways. Charter service was provided by other carriers, but is not included
within the relevant definition of the market. Texas International-National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition of Control of and Merger with National,
Docket Nos. 79-12-163, 79-12-164, 79-12-165 at 47-54 (October 24, 1979).
" Id. at 50-51.
"Id. at 1 (separate statement of Chairman Cohen and member Schaffer).
"In any case, our decision (and this is true for member Bailey as well) is based
on the belief that approval of the Pan Am acquisition with a transfer of MiamiLondon authority would be anticompetitive and we do not think a federal court
would have permitted the merger to proceed if this market imperfection could
not have been corrected." (Emphasis supplied) Id.
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that this "transaction would not meet significant transportation
conveniences and needs of the public."' In view of the negative
conclusion regarding lessening of competition in other markets,
the question of transportation conveniences and needs was not
further discussed in this decision. Unlike Texas International, Pan
American had developed this aspect of the case for the merger at
some length, the major point being that the merger was needed to
enable the carrier "to acquire a suitable domestic system" without
which it would "no longer be a viable competitor" in the current
"competitive international aviation environment."5 According to
the airline's spokesmen, the proposed merger was the "only feasible
way" for it to acquire such a feeder system "at a reasonable cost
and in sufficient time."58 This line of argument had proved unconvincing to the administrative law judge, who concluded that Pan
American was perfectly capable of building up a domestic feeder
system on a phased entry basis and would indeed do so if the
merger did not go forward." He did find that the transaction would
bring about "service benefits in the form of single-carrier service"
and that "in one domestic market there would be improved competitive service."' These benefits he found to be "minor," and not
significant enough to outweigh the merger's anticompetitive effects.
In addition to two general "public interest" arguments already
disposed of in connection with Texas International-National, i.e.,
the possible encouragement of a "merger wave" and the arguable
general preferability of internal expansion to growth by acquisition,
the Board rejected an additional "public interest" contention aimed
at the Pan American-National merger, namely, the judge's suggestion that it would contravene the present national policy of
promoting greater competition in international air transportation.
Here the Board reiterated its finding that the merger, as conditioned
would not substantially lessen competition, and stated its opinion
that if the elimination of one United States-flag carrier in multipledesignation markets were to be regarded as "in and of itself anti56
Id. at 51.
11Texas International - National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition of Control of and Merger with National, CAB Docket Nos. 33,112, 33,283,
at 115 (April 5, 1979) (decision of administrative law judge).
58Id.

at 118-19, 121-22.
"Id. at 124-125.
"Id.
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competitive," the result would be to "block all mergers involving
international carriers despite the fact that new entrants would not
be restrained." 1
North Central-Southern
The Board's only other affirmative decisione2 to date under the
new section 408 throws relatively little light on its interpretation
of the section or the economic issues it involves. In the North
Central-Southern Merger Case (North Central-Southern), the prospective partners were two local service carriers which served no
common city-pair markets but which were alleged to be potential
competitors on several routes. As in the two cases already discussed,
the Board found no probability of any lessening of competition.
In this decision, however, the supporting reasoning was not disclosed; it was merely stated that "no party has offered any convincing evidence or argument that the combination of North Central and Southern would fail under any of the alternative interpretations'"' of the law. The conclusion of the administrative law judge
was adopted, but with the disclaimer that the Board's decision not
to issue its own opinion did "not necessarily constitute an endorsement of the rationale"'4 set forth by the judge. Again, the question
of "transportation conveniences and needs" did not arise.
If one accepts the Board's assertion that none of the public
parties to the proceeding, including the Board's Bureau of Consumer Protection and the Department of Justice, and only one of
the private parties found any anticompetitive effects whatsoever,"
it is difficult to find fault with the Board's conclusion. However,
it may be useful to note that this conclusion seems to be almost
impossible to reconcile with the facts cited by the Board itself only
nine months before the decision was served.' Moreover, it should
1 Texas International - National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition of Control of and Merger with National, CAB Order Nos. 79-12-163,
79-12-164, 79-12-165, at 6 (Oct. 24, 1979).
' 2 North Central-Southern Merger Case, CAB Docket Nos. 33,136, 34,430,
CAB Order Nos. 79-6-7, 79-6-8 (May 15, 1979).
3Id. at 4.
" Id. at 2 n. 5.
65Id. at 4.
"aTexas International -National Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition of Control of and Merger with National, and Enforcement Investigation,
CAB Docket No. 33,112, CAB Order No. 78-8-150 at 9 (August 25, 1978).
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not be overlooked that the "uncontroverted" evidence adduced by
the parties to demonstrate the improbability of new competition on
the "bridge" routes connecting the two systems consists of a recital
of possible commercial deterrents, such as the "thinness" of the
markets, and the self-serving statements of the applicants concerning their plans for expansion in the immediate future."
Continental-Western
Of the two applications "tentatively" disapproved by the Board,
one was a proposed merger between Continental and Western
Air Lines, the Continental-Western Merger Case (ContinentalWestern)." The application had been recommended for approval
by an administrative law judge largely because he believed that the
anticompetitive effects of the transaction would be outweighed by
the fare reductions promised by the applicants."' The judge's careful
market-by-market analysis of probable effects on competition"0
compares favorably with the traditional abstract computation of
before-and-after market shares. Also, his refusal to take at face
value the -applicants' predictions of cost reductions seems to be
well supported by past experience, although it cannot be said that
a convincing case was made for his conclusion that the most likely
effect of the merger on unit costs was no change one way or the
other.' Nevertheless, the decision contains no evidence of any
serious attempt to evaluate the probable benefits to passengers
which could result from the proposed fare reductions or to estimate
the countervailing effect of the anticompetitive consequences.
"[A]s to the North Central-Southern merger, these two carriers appear to be

likely potential entrants into each other's markets and route systems. Geographically these carriers are standing on the edge of each other's systems. Indeed,
as a result of recent grants of new operating authority, each is now extending
its route system into the primary region saved by the other . .

.

. Also, as a

result of our advocacy of liberalized market entry, both are now seeking authority
in 40 common city-pair markets. We also note that both Southern and North
Central now serve Chicago, Detroit and New York ... [and] that the predominant aircraft operated by both carriers is the DC-9." Id.
7

North Central -Southern Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 33,136 at 68-71
(decision of the administrative law judge) (Feb. 9, 1979).
68 Continental-Western Merger Case, CAB Order No. 79-9-185, CAB Docket
1

No. 33,465 (Sept. 27, 1979).

"'Continental-Western Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 33,465 at 131 (May
24, 1979) (decision of the administrative law judge).
7
"Id.
at 19-20, 33-72.
71
1d. at 114-15.
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Therefore, the judge's conclusion on the relative "weight" of these
considerations" is unconvincing.
The merger project was abandoned by Continental shortly after
the Board announced its tentative disapproval and publicly instructed its staff to prepare an appropriate decision. No formal
opinion was ever issued by the Board. However, its findings and
conclusions were summarized in an order dismissing the merger
application and denying Western's motion for the issuance of a
written opinion." The conclusion that the merger might result in
a substantial lessening of competition was based on findings that
the carriers were "both aggressive competitors," 4 that they were
actually competing with each other in twelve city-pair markets and
were potential competitors in many others, most of which were in
the West, and that in some of these markets "especially those with
constraints on entry imposed by airport rules or limitations, the
elimination of actual or potential competition is a serious problem."" In these particular markets, the Board's "important concerns
about competition" were not "mitigated or . . . eliminated by the
presence of a sufficient number of other actual and potential competitors who should provide the necessary market discipline.""5
In addition, it was found that the combination "would cause a substantial increase in the number of markets, again primarily in the
West, in which the merged carrier and United Air Lines would
be the principal, if not the only, effective competitors," and thus
would create "an unduly high risk of tacit cooperation or mutual
accommodation between the two carriers at a time when air fares
still appear to be above competitive levels."' Here again, the
Board's concerns were "heightened" by evidence that the response
of new entrants to "noncompetitive price/service offerings by incumbents" would be made more difficult by entry barriers, since
"not all western airports had immediate additional capacity for
new entrants and . . . others were subject to environmental con2

Id. at 124-25.

" Continental-Western

1979).
74

Id. at 1-2.

7 Id. at 2.
6Id.
"Id.

8Id.

Merger Case, CAB Order No. 79-9-185

(Sept. 27,
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straints."" The passage just summarized was followed by dictum, the relationship of which to future policy does not seem wholly
clear. The Board indicated that its judgment might have been different if the level and pattern of airline pricing had been more satisfactory. It also stated that the arrival of this desirable state of
affairs, currently in process of materialization, might be delayed
by approval of the Continental-Western merger."0
The applicants' allegations concerning benefits to result from
the merger were adjudged to be unsupported by the record. 1 The
promised lower fares "would not necessarily result unless the Board
were to place controls on the fares of the merged carrier,"'" an action which would be contrary to established policy. Some of the
promised additional long-haul service had already been initiated,
in some cases by one of the would-be partners. Promises of
increased service to small communities were unenforceable, and
in any case their enforcement would be contrary to public policy."
The evidence did not indicate "that the merged carrier would be
a stronger competitor or that it would be in a better position to
challenge the largest carriers."" Additionally, there was no consideration of the carriers' claim with regard to cost reductions.
Unlike the judge, the Board did not claim that its judgment had
7

9Id.
10 From the consumer's standpoint, fares in these markets may already

be too high or unnecessarily discriminatory. In the recent past fares
in all domestic markets were determined by regulatory policies that
often discouraged efficiency and price-cutting. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 permanently changed these policies by calling
for open entry and wide fare flexibility. However, there is little
reason to believe that competitive discipline has as yet fully or even
substantially eliminated the inefficiencies of the past. The possible
persistence of noncompetitive fares naturally increases our desire for
open competition and heightens our concern with any intercarrier
arrangement that has a substantial probability of delaying its
arrival.
Id. at 2-3.
01id. Continental-Western Merger Case, C.A.B. Order No. 79-9-185 at 3
(Sept. 27, 1979).
8

I1d.

Id. "To the extent that any serious threat of loss of essential air service
might be involved, the Federal Aviation Act, as amended in 1978, provides for
specific federal subsidy-and impliedly disavows reliance on cross-subsidizing

smaller community service through super-competitive profits in competitively
restricted markets." Id.
"Id.
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been arrived at by weighing prospective benefits against prospective detriments. Thus, it was under no obligation to evaluate either
for the purpose of this comparison. The agency did, of course, have
to find that the detriments were "substantial," but some estimate
of their quantity and duration would have been useful to the applicants if they were to undertake to prove that the benefits outweighed
the detriments, for example, on appeal. In the present instance, this
particular point was not at issue since the Board was not rendering a binding decision on the merits of the case. For the same
reason, the opinion presumably does not carry the precedentestablishing force that such a binding decision would have had, so
that a precise statement of the Board's position would not have
been useful for providing reliable guidance for possible future
applicants.' The problem of evaluating detriments will be discussed
in the concluding section.
Eastern-National
In Application of Eastern Airlines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Control of National Airlines, Inc. (Eastern-National),the
application of Eastern Air Lines for authority to acquire control
of National was dismissed, without a formal opinion on the merits,
in accordance with a motion made by Eastern shortly after the
Board had announced a tentative decision to disapprove the application and after it had ordered preparation of an appropriate
order." The administrative law judge had recommended disapproval because the transaction would have caused "substantial
lessening of actual competition in the New York-Florida, Washington-Florida, New York-Washington, and intra-Florida mar"In justifying its refusal to issue a formal opinion, the Board disavowed any
intention of establishing policy in a statement which would not be subject to

judicial review, although in the public ("Sunshine") meeting where the tentative disapproval of the Continental-Western merger was announced it had not
hesitated to issue "guidelines" which appeared to have just that effect. See
Pan American Gets National Majority, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 30,

1979 at 22-23 for a general account of these "guidelines". On this point, the
Board declared that it had not intended to adopt a method of establishing policy

which did not seem "legally sound," and issued a warning that "parties who act
on the basis of sunshine discussions do so at their own risk." Continental-Western
Merger Case, CAB Order No. 79-8-185 at 7 (Sept. 27, 1979).
"Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Control of National Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 34,226. CAB Order No. 79-12-74
(Dec. 17, 1979) (dismissing the application).
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kets. '" The anticompetitive effects were adjudged prima facie substantial on the basis of traditional market share criteria,88 and the
cumulative effect of several entry barriers, including "a short-term
unavailability of efficient aircraft, limitation of air space at slotrestricted airports which [were] important to some of the markets
involved ... , marketing advantages of an Eastern/National combination, and some slight economies of scale,"8 was found to be
sufficiently important to show that entry into the enumerated markets was "not easy enough to rebut the prima facie case."" The
judge accepted Eastern's argument that the merged carrier would
have lower costs and provide better service than the separate airlines," but did not feel obligated to undertake a serious evaluation
of these claimed benefits because Eastern itself did not choose to
"rely on the overriding transportation defense.""
In its order dismissing the application, the Board set forth
the following explanation of its decision to disapprove the application: "A majority of the Board believed that a substantial reduction in competition was a likely result of approval. Our findings were keyed to the specific problems of competition involving
airports that are operating under capacity restraints. ''" The press
release issued at the time of the announcement of tentative disapproval indicated that the New York-Florida and WashingtonFlorida markets were "[o]f particular concern," and that "slotcontrolled airports like New York's LaGuardia and Washington
National" were considered to be a source of "problems" for wouldbe new competitors." As these statements show, the Board's view
was in some respects similar to that of the judge; however, it would
be inappropriate to conclude that the Board would have endorsed
the judge's opinion as a whole.

"Application of Eastern Airlines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of Control of National Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 34,226, at 62 (June 4, 1979)
(initial decision of the administrative law judge).
"Id. at 33-36.
"9Id. at 51.
90 Id.
"I Id. at 14-15.
"2Id. at 21.

Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Approval of Acquisition of
Control of National Airlines, Inc., CAB Order No. 79-12-74 at 2 (Dec. 17,
1979).
94

CAB Press Release No. 79-219 at 1 (Sept. 27, 1979).
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CONCLUSION

Viewed in light of this short and rather sketchy record, do the
new criteria seem to be fulfilling their apparent promise of judgment of individual merger proposals on the basis of their economic merits? There has been no case in which the Board has
actually felt compelled to compare substantial anticompetitive
effects with admitted cost savings or product improvements and
come out with a net result." The three positive decisions reflected
findings of no substantial lessening of competition. In the one informal negative decision where both sorts of effect were mentioned
as relevant (Continental-Western), the claims of benefit were
found to be unsupported by the record. With one side of the scale
declared empty there is obviously no need for a balancing process.
There has also been no case in which an attempt has been made
to evaluate anticompetitive effects, although the positive decisions
rest on findings that these effects are not "substantial" and the
negative (informal) decisions rest on contrary findings. As has
been suggested above, such an evaluation will assume particular
importance if applicants undertake to bear the burden of proving
that anticompetitive effects are outweighed by benefits, and this
situation has not yet arisen. In any formal decision, however, such
an evaluation would have the very desirable result of providing a
definite precedent for the guidance of those who might be contemplating proposal of other mergers. At any rate, it is quite clear
that if there is to be a genuine comparison of economic costs and
benefits there must be a common denominator in terms of which
both positive and negative factors are expressed. Hence, measurement of anticompetitive effects in terms of probable cost to consumers is a necessary element in the calculation. Does experience
under the new law provide any evidence on the possibility or probability that a useful technique of evaluation will be developed?
15Only one of the decisions of the administrative law judges, ContinentalWestern, was represented as depending upon a genuine weighing process. As

has been noted, the representation was not convincing. The sixth proposal submitted under the Airline Deregulation Act, although not yet passed on by the
Board, has been recommended for approval by an administrative law judge.
Again, there was no weighing; the proposal was found not to entail any sub-

stantial lessening of competition, so that it was "unnecessary to reach the 'convenience and needs' issue." Tiger International-Seaboard World Airlines, Inc.
Acquisition Case, CAB Docket No. 33,712 at 61 (Jan. 15, 1980) (decision of
the administrative law judge).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

A sine qua non of such a development is the abandonment of
the orthodox dogma which measures the "substantiality" of the
anticompetitive impact of a merger by reference to the share of
total sales in any market which would be accounted for by the
combined firm created by the transaction, or accords to market
share a preponderant role in determining "substantiality."" Therefore, the Board's awareness of the theoretical and practical weakness of the market share criterion and its avoidance of using this
criterion to measure anticompetitive effects must be counted as
an important step in the right direction. As has been noted, the
discussion of this point in connection with the Texas InternationalNational and Pan American-National proposals is notable for its
realistic treatment of this much-misused criterion. Because there
is no reliable correlation between market share or concentration
ratio and the magnitude of probable harm to consumers, it is
impossible in principle to translate these percentages into any
form which would be directly comparable to an estimate of the
value of cost savings or product improvements. Moreover, as the
Board has recognized, any useful technique for evaluating the
effects of individual transactions must rely on an analysis of the
particular circumstances in the affected market rather than the
mechanical application of a general theory of "market power"
which purports to supply critical percentages applicable to all
markets interchangeably.
On the other hand, it cannot be said that the Board has advanced very far in developing an interpretation of the statutory
"substantial lessening of competition" standard which would provide a conceptual guide for an appropriate estimate of detrimental
public consequences. Thus, though the agency has recognized the
importance of non-commercial entry barrier 9 in determining the
effectiveness of potential competition and hence the anticompetitive
impact of eliminating actual competition, there seems to have been
no recognition of the fact that these barriers vary greatly in im"For

example, where a given percentage share is regarded as establishing a

rebuttable presumption that there is a "substantial lessening of competition."

"r"Commercial" entry barriers are those which are rooted in the supply or
demand characteristics of the industry's product, for example, high initial in-

vestment requirements or larger marketing expenditures needed to establish
"market identity." "Non-commercial" entry barriers may result from regulation
or from other constraints such as the limited capacity of an airport.
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pact from market to market, not only because of intermarket differ-

ences in the importance of competition from outside the market
boundaries (i.e., the competition of substitutes)," but because of
differences in the expected duration of the various non-commercial
barriers. The special importance attributed to the Bermuda II

United States-London entry restrictions in Pan American-National,
to shortages of gate space, environmental constraints, and slot
restrictions at certain airports in Continental-Western, and to airport slot controls in Eastern-Nationalsuggests a tendency to attribute automatically a "substantial" effect to the elimination of competition in any market affected by non-commercial restrictions.
In fact, it may well be that all of these restraints can and will be
overcome in a relatively short period of time."' The effect of extinguishing competition in a market with non-commercial entry
barriers is not necessarily very large, nor is the effect of extinguishing competition in a market without non-commercial entry barriers
necessarily negligible, even in the airline industry.'
Again, the problem of evaluating the effects of probable new
competition between would-be merger participants if approval
is not granted cannot be sidestepped merely by limiting the analysis
to a very short-term point of view, e.g., by pointing out the "thin-

ness" of present patronage on the affected routes or the present
existence of non-commercial entry barriers which may be subject
to modernization or elimination in the foreseeable future.0 1 More0 See text accompanying notes
48-60 supra. (discussions of the Board's
treatment of the Miami-London route in the Pan American-National case).
The competition of a product's substitutes is one important determinant of the
elasticity of demand for the product itself, and hence is an important source
of protection of consumers from "monopolistic exploitation," including that
resulting from anticompetitive mergers.
99In the case of the United States-London market, for example, possibilities
for entry were greatly increased by a new bilateral agreement arrived at by
the United States and the United Kingdom in March, 1980. In this case, the
Board was able to reverse its former decision and allow Pan American to continue to serve the Miami-London route, as it had been doing under a temporary
authorization. Miami-London Tentatively Given to Pan Am, Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., April 14, 1980 at 24-25.
"oFor example, there is always a time-lag before new competition is in
place. Some non-commercial barriers, such as airport space limitations, are not
overcome once for all but may be expected to recur as total traffic expands. The
available potential competitor may be less efficient or innovative than the former
actual competitor.
101 See note 63, 67 supra and accompanying text.
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over, the presence of other actual and potential competitors, however capable, does not automatically cancel out the effects of this
particular element in the total anticompetitive impact of any given
proposal."'2 The painfully evident difficulty of assigning any plausible value to these factors unfortunately does not make them irrelevant or negligible in fact." '
To observe that no satisfactory method of estimating the probable detrimental effect of a proposed merger has been devised is
by no means to imply any criticism of the performance of the
Board. On the contrary, the Board deserves to be commended for
recognizing the complexity of the problem and for calling attention
to the simplistic nature of the orthodox approach. As suggested
above, the Board is subject to legitimate criticism for ignoring or
minimizing the impact of certain undoubtedly significant determinants of overall anticompetitive effect, and for representing as
definitive the results of an incomplete and therefore unrealistic
analysis. Obviously, however, it is not appropriate to offer criticism
for failure to perform an inherently impossible task. As the Board's
own analysis has helped to demonstrate, the factors involved appear
to be so numerous and variable from case to case, and their combined probable result at various times in the future so difficult to
predict, that even a serious and sustained attempt at measurement
would in all probability produce an estimate with an unacceptably
high degree of unreliability.
If this is indeed the case, then the promise apparently held out
by the statute of a cost-benefit judgment of individual merger
proposals is and must remain a false one. If an economically
acceptable method of dealing with mergers is ever to be devised,
it will not involve case-by-case comparison of benefits and detriments. Even if a satisfactory method were devised for producing a
realistic estimate of the beneficial consequences of a proposed
merger-and experience indicates that this would require a much
more sophisticated, painstaking, and skeptical approach than has
0

See notes 42-40 supra and accompanying text.

0

The Board may have been tempted to assume the contrary. According to

a press account of the "Sunshine" meeting at which "merger guidelines" were
announced, "[t]he CAB generally rejected the idea of potential competition as a
barrier to mergers, saying it is too speculative." Pan Am Gets National Majority,
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 30, 1979 at 23. See note 67 supra.
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been the rule in the past ' -there would be no way to compare it
with the unquantified anticompetitive effect. For the same reason,
the present language of the statute loads the dice against the
merger proponents. Since the law in effect places upon the proponents the burden of proving that the prospective benefits outweigh the anticompetitive effects, they are faced with the need to
demonstrate what is essentially undemonstrable. This consideration may well help to explain why none of the merger proponents
so far seem to have attempted to develop and pursue a very extensive or persuasive case based on product improvements and cost
reductions."° If the judgment on the basis of competitive effects
is in all likelihood destined to determine the verdict, it may reasonably be concluded that efforts expended on proof of countervailing
benefits stand a good chance of being wasted.""
Regarding the two elements of apparent legislative intent identified at the beginning of the discussion, experience under the statute
suggests certain tentative conclusions. First, as has just been indicated, the attention devoted to the beneficial consequences of proposed mergers by regulators and proponents has been slight, and
there seems to be no reason to expect that this situation will change.
Second, the Board still enjoys a very wide range of discretion in
administering the law. Although "public interest" considerations
cannot, under the new law, be adduced to justify permitting transactions not satisfying the antitrust tests, a finding of "substantial
lessening of competition" has been held to depend upon a multiplicity of factors which vary in relative impact from market to
market and whose effects do not appear to be susceptible of objec104 See generally Keyes, supra note 4.
1' Pan American's case for its acquisition

of National was to an important

extent based on "transportation convenience and needs," but as has been indi-

cated, its argument centered upon the issue of its future "viability"-a variant of
the "failing company" doctrine, which is really an aspect of the analysis of
possible anticompetitive effects. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
100According to the testimony of the Department of Justice in Texas International-National, Pan American-National, "[s]ince the enactment of the Bank
Merger Act in 1966 no bank merger has prevailed on the benefits test where
the merger has been found to be anticompetitive." Texas International-National

Acquisition Case, Pan American Acquisition of Control of and Merger with
National, CAB Docket Nos. 33,112, 33,283 at 81-82 (April 5, 1979) (decision
of the administrative law judge). This historical evidence may have served further to discourage serious attempts to demonstrate cost reduction or product

improvements.
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tive evaluation. Being therefore free to adopt its own appraisal of
their combined impact, the Board can make a plausible case for
or against "substantiality" in virtually any set of circumstances.
Given the practical impossibility of demonstrating that "conveniences and benefits" outweigh those anticompetitive effects, the
agency's conclusion on "substantiality" is of decisive importance.
Its discretion is therefore practically unconfined.
When the enforcement of section 408 in the domestic sphere is
turned over to the Department of Justice in January, 1983, there
may be a substantial change in the administrative interpretation
of the law. Traditional antitrust doctrines may well be more strictly
adhered to; for example, the orthodox practice of according very
great significance to market shares and concentration ratios may
be followed, and the Board's more realistic approach to these matters accordingly may be abandoned. Merger proposals such as
Texas International-Nationaland Pan American-National may be
therefore less likely to succeed. In this sense, the discretion of the
administrative agency may become more circumscribed. However,
the historical record does not seem to provide any reason to suppose that attention to potential cost reductions or product improvements will increase. Finally, there seems to be little hope that the
principles followed by the new enforcers will be any more defensible in economic terms than have those which have apparently
guided the Board.

